import { describe, expect, mock, test } from "bun:test";

mock.module("cloudflare:workers", () => ({
  env: { SECRETS_KEY: "test-secret", PUBLIC_URL: "https://forge.example.com" },
}));

const { renderMarkdown } = await import("./markdown");
const { verifyCamoPath } = await import("./camo-sign");

const context = { owner: "acme", repo: "app", ref: "main", basePath: "docs" };

function camoTargets(html: string): string[] {
  return [...html.matchAll(/src="(\/camo\/[^"]+)"/g)].map((match) => verifyCamoPath(match[1]) ?? "INVALID");
}

describe("renderMarkdown hardening", () => {
  test("external markdown images are rewritten to signed camo URLs", () => {
    const html = renderMarkdown("![x](https://evil.example/pixel.gif)", context);
    expect(html).not.toContain("https://evil.example/pixel.gif");
    expect(camoTargets(html)).toEqual(["https://evil.example/pixel.gif"]);
  });

  test("raw <img> and protocol-relative sources are proxied too", () => {
    const html = renderMarkdown('<img src="//tracker.example/p.png"><img src="http://a.example/b.jpg">', context);
    expect(camoTargets(html)).toEqual(["https://tracker.example/p.png", "http://a.example/b.jpg"]);
  });

  test("slashless and backslash external images are proxied, not loaded directly", () => {
    const html = renderMarkdown("![a](http:evil.example/a.gif) ![b](https:/evil.example/b.gif)", context);
    expect(html).not.toMatch(/src="https?:/);
    expect(camoTargets(html)).toEqual(["http://evil.example/a.gif", "https://evil.example/b.gif"]);
    const bare = renderMarkdown("![c](/\\evil.example/c.gif)", null);
    expect(bare).not.toContain('src="/\\evil');
  });

  test("raw external anchors always get rel, even with rel= text in another attribute", () => {
    const html = renderMarkdown('<a href="https://spam.example" title="x rel=y">x</a>', context);
    expect(html).toContain('rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer"');
  });

  test("relative, attachment and data images stay same-origin", () => {
    const html = renderMarkdown(
      '![a](./img.png) ![b](/attachments/abc) <img src="">',
      context,
    );
    expect(html).toContain('src="/acme/app/raw/main/docs/img.png"');
    expect(html).toContain('src="/attachments/abc"');
    expect(html).toContain('src=""');
    expect(html).not.toContain("/camo/");
  });

  test("user-supplied ids and names are prefixed to prevent DOM clobbering", () => {
    const html = renderMarkdown('<a id="__TANSTACK_ROUTER_STATE__" name="submit">x</a><h2 id="top">T</h2>', context);
    expect(html).toContain('id="user-content-__TANSTACK_ROUTER_STATE__"');
    expect(html).toContain('name="user-content-submit"');
    expect(html).toContain('id="user-content-top"');
    expect(renderMarkdown("[go](#top)", context)).toContain('href="#user-content-top"');
  });

  test("external link attributes are escaped and still get rel", () => {
    const html = renderMarkdown('<a href="https://x.example/?a=1<b>&c=\'">link</a>', context);
    expect(html).toContain('rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer"');
    expect(html).not.toMatch(/href="[^"]*<[^"]*"/);
    expect(renderMarkdown("[l](https://x.example)", context)).toContain('rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer"');
  });

  test("dangerous schemes are still dropped", () => {
    expect(renderMarkdown('<a href="javascript:alert(1)">x</a>', context)).not.toContain("javascript:");
    expect(renderMarkdown("[x](javascript:alert(1))", context)).not.toContain("href=");
    expect(renderMarkdown('<img src="data:image/svg+xml,<svg onload=alert(1)>">', context)).not.toContain("svg+xml");
  });
});